Q-anonymous social welfare relations on infinite utility streams by Kamaga Kohei & Kojima Takashi
  
21COE-GLOPE Working Paper Series 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
If you have any comment or question on the working paper series, please contact each author. 
When making a copy or reproduction of the content, please contact us in advance to request 
permission. The source should explicitly be credited. 
GLOPE Web Site: http://www.waseda.jp/prj-GLOPE/en/index.html
 
Q-anonymous social welfare relations 
on infinite utility streams 
 
 
 
 
Kohei Kamaga and Takashi Kojima 
 
 
  Revised version of No.41: 
  Concluding remarks are slightly changed. 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 47 
Q-anonymous social welfare relations on inﬁnite
utility streams¤
Kohei Kamagay and Takashi Kojimaz
First version, September 10, 2007;
Current version, March 31, 2008
Abstract
We examine whether Q-Anonymity, the axiom of impartiality stronger than
Finite Anonymity, and Pigou-Dalton Equity or Hammond Equity, the well-known
consequentialist equity axioms, are compatible in a strongly Paretian social welfare
relation (SWR) on inﬁnite utility streams. For each of the two equity axioms,
we provide the characterization of the equitable subclass of Q-anonymous and
strongly Paretian SWRs: in the case of Pigou-Dalton Equity, all SWRs to which the
extended generalized Lorenz SWR is a subrelation, and in the case of Hammond
Equity, all SWRs to which the extended leximin SWR is a subrelation. To make
clear the difference between these SWRs and the extended utilitarian SWR in terms
of their equity properties, we also provide a new characterization of the extended
utilitarian SWR using an equity axiom stated in the similar situations to those
considered in Pigou-Dalton Equity and Hammond Equity.
Keywords: Q-Anonymity, Intergenerational equity, Generalized Lorenz criterion,
Leximin principle, Utilitarianism, Simpliﬁed criterion
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D63, D70
¤We would like to thank Geir B. Asheim and Koichi Suga for their helpful comments and suggestions.
Remaining errors are our own. Financial support from the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports
and Technology under Waseda University 21st COE-GLOPE project is gratefully acknowledged.
yGraduate School of Economics, Waseda University, 1-6-1, Nishi-waseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050,
Japan; e-mail: k-kmg@ruri.waseda.jp
zGraduate School of Economics, Waseda University, 1-6-1, Nishi-waseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050,
Japan; e-mail: tkojima@ruri.waseda.jp
1
1 Introduction
Consider a situation where we need to choose one among several alternative policies
which will affect inﬁnitely many future generations as well as the present generation
(e.g. greenhouse gas abatement programs). If we are concerned only with each gener-
ation’s welfare measured in terms of utility, we can deal with such an intergenerational
decision problem by using a social welfare relation (SWR), a reﬂexive and transitive
binary relation, deﬁned on inﬁnite utility streams.1 In exploring the SWRs which will
be acceptable not only for the present generation but also for future generations, two
basic principles are usually considered. One is Strong Pareto, the axiom of efﬁciency,
and the other is Finite Anonymity, the axiom of impartiality, which asserts that two util-
ity streams related by permuting ﬁnitely many generations are socially indifferent. It is
known that these two basic axioms together are equivalent to the inﬁnite-horizon vari-
ant of the well-known justice principle called Suppes-Sen grading principle (Svensson
1980; Asheim et al. 2001).2 Although this justice principle “does squeeze out as much
as possible out of the use of dominance (or vector inequality)” (Sen 1970, p.151), there
still be problems to be resolved. Asheim and Tungodden (2004) point out the follow-
ing two problems. One is that what the Suppes-Sen grading principle by itself asserts
on the intergenerational decision-making may be insufﬁcient to resolve distributional
conﬂicts among generations in many cases, and the other is that Finite Anonymity is
too weak to realize impartial treatment of inﬁnitely many generations in a satisfactory
manner.
To resolve the former issue, i.e. the problem of distributional conﬂicts among gen-
erations, Asheim and Tungodden (2004) and Bossert et al. (2007) examine the pos-
sibility of additionally imposing a consequentialist equity requirement. Asheim and
Tungodden (2004) examine the case of adding the inﬁnite-horizon variant of Ham-
mond Equity and show that the two versions of the leximin principle are characterized
in terms of Strong Pareto, Finite Anonymity, Hammond Equity, and one of two alter-
native preference-continuity axioms. Bossert et al. (2007) consider not only the case of
adding Hammond Equity but also the case of imposing the weaker equity axiom called
Pigou-Dalton Equity.3 They characterize the inﬁnite-horizon generalized Lorenz cri-
terion in terms of Strong Pareto, Finite Anonymity, and Pigou-Dalton Equity and also
show that the inﬁnite-horizon leximin principle is characterized if Pigou-Dalton Equity
1Some readers may think that a complete SWR, i.e. social welfare ordering (SWO), is more desirable
since it can compare any two utility streams. Nevertheless, a non-complete SWR can play a sufﬁcient role in
selecting optimal or maximal paths in some economic models (Mitra 2005; Basu andMitra 2007). Moreover,
using Arrow’s (1963) variant of Szpilrajn’s (1930) theorem, our results stated in terms of a SWR ensure the
existence of the SWO that respects the comparisons obtained by the SWR in question in a non-constructive
manner.
2The Suppes-Sen grading principle is originally deﬁned in a ﬁnite population setting. For details, we
refer the reader to Suppes (1966) and Sen (1970).
3Pigou-Dalton Equity is also employed by Sakai (2003a; 2003b; 2006) and Hara et al. (2007).
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is strengthened to Hammond Equity.4 These existing characterizations surely provide
the possibility of equitable resolutions to distributional conﬂicts among generations.
The purpose of this paper is to explore a further resolution beyond those estab-
lished in Asheim and Tungodden (2004) and Bossert et al. (2007) by not only adding
the equity axiom, Pigou-Dalton Equity or Hammond Equity, but also strengthening the
impartiality requirement in the strongly Paretian and ﬁnitely anonymous SWRs. In
other words, we explore a resolution not only to the distributional conﬂict but also to
the weakness of Finite Anonymity, i.e. the latter issue mentioned above. Since the
axiom of Strong Anonymity deﬁned by all logically possible permutations of inﬁnitely
many generations inevitably comes in conﬂict with Strong Pareto (van Liedekerke
1995; Lauwers 1997a), we must consider the intermediate between Finite Anonymity
and Strong Anonymity. In this paper, we focus on the anonymity axiom called Q-
Anonymity. Q-Anonymity was ﬁrst introduced in Lauwers (1997b) by the name Fixed
Step Anonymity.5 Q-Anonymity is deﬁned in terms not only of ﬁnite permutations
but also of inﬁnite but cyclic permutations, and thus it is logically stronger than Fi-
nite Anonymity but weaker than Strong Anonymity. Although many existing works
show the possibilities of Q-anonymous and strongly Paretian SWRs (Lauwers 1997b;
Fleurbaey and Michel 2003; Banerjee 2006; Mitra and Basu 2007), the compatibil-
ity of Q-anonymity and the equity requirements in the strongly Paretian SWRs is still
uncovered in the literature. In this paper, we examine the possibility of additionally im-
posingQ-Anonymity on the SWR that satisﬁes Strong Pareto and Pigou-Dalton Equity
or Hammond Equity.
The results obtained in this paper are positive. We deﬁne the extensions of the
generalized Lorenz and the leximin SWRs, called Q-generalized Lorenz criterion and
Q-leximin principle respectively, in the same way as Banerjee (2006a) does for the
Suppes-Sen and the utilitarian SWRs. Then, we show that each of the Q-generalized
Lorenz criterion and the Q-leximin principle is well-deﬁned as a SWR on inﬁnite util-
ity streams and that the former is characterized by Strong Pareto, Q-Anonymity and
Pigou-Dalton Equity and the latter in terms of Strong Pareto, Q-Anonymity and Ham-
mond Equity. Compared to the characterizations established in Bossert et al. (2007)
with Finite Anonymity, our results can be regarded as the reﬁnement of the impartial
subclasses of the strongly Paretian and equitable SWRs by using the stronger impar-
tiality axiom, Q-Anonymity.
As we brieﬂy noted above, the Q-anonymous extension of a ﬁnitely anonymous
SWR is already proposed by Banerjee (2006a) for the Suppes-Sen and the utilitar-
4The logical relationship among the two versions of the leximin principle characterized by Asheim and
Tungodden (2004) and the leximin principle in Bossert et al. (2007) is the same as the one among the
chatching-up criterion, the overtaking criterion, and the utilitarian SWR in Basu and Mitra (2007).
5See also Fleurbaey and Michel (2003).
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ian SWRs. He characterizes the extended Suppes-Sen SWR by Strong Pareto and
Q-Anonymity and also does the extended utilitarian SWR, called Q-utilitarian SWR,
in terms of Strong Pareto,Q-Anonymity, and an informational invariance axiom called
Partial Translation Scale Invariance. Compared to Banerjee’s (2006a) results, our re-
sults can also be interpreted as the characterizations of the equitable subclasses of the
strongly Paretian and Q-anonymous SWRs by using Pigou-Dalton Equity and Ham-
mond Equity. To make clear the difference between our newly established SWRs,
the Q-generalized Lorenz and the Q-leximin SWRs, and the Q-utilitarian SWR in
terms of their equity properties, we also provide an alternative characterization of the
Q-utilitarian SWR focusing on its equity property. We show that the Q-utilitarian
SWR is also characterized by Strong Pareto, Q-Anonymity, and Incremental Equity.
Incremental Equity is the axiom that prescribes a resolution to the conﬂicting situa-
tions similar to those considered in Pigou-Dalton Equity and Hammond Equity, and
it requires that, for any utility transfer between two generations, a pre-transfer utility
stream and a post-transfer stream must be socially indifferent. Our characterizations
of the three Q-anonymous SWRs, the Q-generalized Lorenz, the Q-leximin, and the
Q-utilitarian SWRs, together tell us how the logically admissible SWRs will change
in accordance with which of the equity axioms, Pigou-Dalton Equity, Hammond Eq-
uity, and Incremental Equity, is additionally imposed on the strongly Paretian and Q
-anonymous SWRs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces notation and def-
initions. In Section 3, we present the axioms we impose on a SWR and also provide the
formal deﬁnitions of the Q-generalized Lorenz criterion and the Q-leximin principle.
Then, the characterizations of them are established. Section 4 provides the character-
ization of the Q-utilitarian SWR using Incremental Equity. Section 5 concludes. All
proofs are available in Appendix.
2 Notation and deﬁnitions
Let R denote the set of all real numbers and N be the set of all positive integers
f1; 2; : : : g. We let X = RN be the domain of inﬁnite utility streams. An inﬁnite-
dimensional vector x = (x1; x2; : : : ) is a typical element of X and, for each i 2 N, xi
is interpreted as utility of the ith generation. For all x 2 X and all n 2 N, we denote
(x1; : : : ; xn) by x¡n and (xn+1; xn+2; : : : ) by x+n. Thus, given any x 2 X and any
n 2 N, we can write x = (x¡n;x+n). For all x 2 X and all n 2 N, ¡x¡n(1) ; : : : ; x¡n(n)¢
denotes a rank-ordered permutation of x¡n such that x¡n(1) · ¢ ¢ ¢ · x¡n(n), ties being
broken arbitrarily.
A SWR, denoted by %, is a reﬂexive and transitive binary relation on X , i.e. a
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quasi-ordering.6 An asymmetric component of % is denoted by Â and a symmetric
component by » respectively, i.e. x Â y if and only if x % y holds but y % x does
not, and x » y if and only if x % y and y % x. A SWR %A is said to be a subrelation
to a SWR %B if, for all x;y 2 X , (i) x »A y implies x »B y and (ii) x ÂA y
implies x ÂB y.
Following Mitra and Basu (2007) and Banerjee (2006a), we represent any permu-
tation on the set of generations N by a permutation matrix. A permutation matrix is an
inﬁnite matrix P = (pij)i;j2N satisfying the following properties:
(i) for each i 2 N, there exists j(i) 2 N such that pij(i) = 1 and pij = 0 for all
j 6= j(i);
(ii) for each j 2 N, there exists i(j) 2 N such that pi(j)j = 1 and pij = 0 for all
i 6= i(j).
Given any permutation matrix P , we denote by P 0 its unique inverse which satisﬁes
P 0P = PP 0 = I , where I denotes the inﬁnite identity matrix. Let P be the set of all
permutation matrices. Given any P 2 P and any n 2 N, we denote the n £ n matrix
(pij)i;j2f1;:::;ng by P (n). A ﬁnite permutation matrix is a permutation matrix P such
that pii = 1 for all i > n for some n 2 N. The set of all ﬁnite permutation matrices is
denoted by F .
As in Mitra and Basu (2007) and Banerjee (2006a), we focus on the class of cyclic
permutations which deﬁnes a group under the usual matrix multiplication.7 A permuta-
tion matrix P 2 P is said to be cyclic if, for any unit vector e = (0; : : : ; 0; 1; 0; : : :) 2
X , there exists k 2 N such that k-times repeated application of P to e generates e
again, i.e.
kz }| {
P ¢ ¢ ¢P e = e. Throughout the paper, we letQ be the following subclass of
P:
Q =
8<:P 2 P : there exists k 2 N such that, for each n 2 N;P (nk) is a ﬁnite-dimensional permutation matrix
9=; :
It is easily checked that Q is the class of cyclic permutations and deﬁnes a group with
respect to matrix multiplication, and also that F ½ Q.
Negation of a statement is indicated by the logic symbol :. Our notation for vector
inequalities on X is as follows: for all x;y 2 X , x > y if xi ¸ yi for all i 2 N, and
x > y if x > y and x 6= y.
6A binary relation % on X is (i) reﬂexive if, for all x 2 X , x % x, and (ii) transitive if, for all
x;y;z 2 X , x% z holds whenever x% y and y % z.
7Let G be a set of permutation matrices. G is said to deﬁne a group under the usual matrix multiplication
if it satisﬁes the following four properties: (i) for all P ;Q 2 G, PQ 2 G, (ii) there exists I 2 G such that
for all P 2 G, IP = PI = P , (iii) for all P 2 G, there exists P 0 2 G such that P 0P = PP 0 = I, and
(iv) for all P ;Q;R 2 G, (PQ)R = P (QR).
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3 Impartiality and consequentialist equity
In this section, we examine the possibility of a strongly Paretian and equitable SWR
that satisﬁes an impartiality axiom stronger than Finite Anonymity. We begin with the
formal deﬁnition of Strong Pareto.
Strong Pareto (SP): For all x;y 2 X , if x > y, then x Â y.
The requirement of impartial treatment of generations is usually formalized by us-
ing permutations of generations. In accordance with an adopted class of permutations,
a different notion of impartiality will be formalized. We consider the following two
alternative impartiality axioms.
F -Anonymity (FA): For all x 2 X and all P 2 F , Px » x.
Q-Anonymity (QA): For all x 2 X and all P 2 Q, Px » x.
FA and QA are also called Finite (or Weak) Anonymity and Fixed Step Anonymity re-
spectively. Since F ½ Q, QA implies FA. While the anonymity axiom deﬁned in
terms of all permutations in P is not compatible with SP (van Liedekerke 1995; Lauw-
ers 1997a), both FA and QA are compatible with SP. SP and FA characterize the
inﬁnite-horizon Suppes-Sen grading principle deﬁned in terms of F (Svensson 1980;
Asheim et al. 2001), and replacing FA with QA, its variant deﬁned by Q is character-
ized (Banerjee 2006a).8
Although the basic principles of efﬁciency and impartiality formalized by SP and
FA or QA are fairly appealing and intuitive in dealing with intergenerational welfare
issues, what they assert on our intergenerational decision-making is quite weak and
may be insufﬁcient to resolve distributional conﬂicts among generations in many cases.
To resolve distributional conﬂicts, Asheim and Tungodden (2004) and Bossert et al.
(2007) examine the possibility of adding a consequentialist equity axiom in a strongly
Paretian and ﬁnitely anonymous SWR. Asheim and Tungodden (2004) consider the
inﬁnite-horizon extension of Hammond Equity.9 Bossert et al. (2007) examine the
case of the weaker equity requirement called Pigou-Dalton Equity as well as Hammond
Equity.
Pigou-Dalton Equity (PDE): For all x;y 2 X , if there exist i; j 2 N such that (i)
yi < xi · xj < yj and xi¡ yi = yj ¡ xj , and (ii) xk = yk for all k 2 N n fi; jg, then
x Â y.
8Mitra and Basu (2007) shows that a class of permutations by which an anonymity axiom compatible
with SP can be deﬁned if and only if the class consists solely of cyclic permutations and deﬁnes group with
respect to matrix multiplication, where we use the term anonymity axiom refer to the condition which asserts
that a SWR must conclude Px» x for all x 2 X and all P in an adopted class of permutations.
9Hammond Equity is originally formulated by Hammond (1976) in a ﬁnite population setting.
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Hammond Equity (HE): For all x;y 2 X , if there exist i; j 2 N such that (i) yi <
xi · xj < yj , and (ii) xk = yk for all k 2 N n fi; jg, then x Â y.
Both two axioms deal with distributional conﬂicts between two generations.10 PDE
asserts that an order-preserving transfer from a relatively better-off generation to a
relatively worse-off generation is strictly socially preferable, i.e. it formalizes the well-
known transfer principle a` la Pigou (1912) and Dalton (1920). On the other hand,
HE asserts that an order-preserving change which diminishes inequality of utilities
between conﬂicting two generations is strictly socially improving. PDE agrees to such
a value judgment by HE as long as the absolute value of utility change are equal for
the conﬂicting two generations. Hence, HE is stronger than PDE.
Bossert et al. (2007) show that SP, FA, and PDE together characterize the inﬁnite-
horizon generalized Lorenz criterion and also that the inﬁnite-horizon leximin principle
is characterized if PDE is strengthened to HE. We now present the formal deﬁnitions
of these two inﬁnite-horizon SWRs. For all n 2 N, let %nG denote the ﬁnite-horizon
generalized Lorenz SWR deﬁned on Rn: for all x¡n;y¡n 2 Rn,
x¡n %nG y¡n ,
Pk
i=1 x
¡n
(i) ¸
Pk
i=1 y
¡n
(i) for all k 2 f1; : : : ; ng:
The generalized Lorenz SWR, denoted %G, is deﬁned as follows: for all x;y 2 X ,
x %G y , there exists n 2 N such that x¡n %nG y¡n and x+n > y+n: (1)
Next, we introduce the leximin SWR. For all n 2 N, let %nL denote the ﬁnite-horizon
leximin SWR deﬁned on Rn: for all x¡n;y¡n 2 Rn,
x¡n %nL y¡n ,
8>>><>>>:
x¡n is a permutation of y¡n, or
there existsm 2 f1; : : : ; ng such that
x¡n(i) = y
¡n
(i) for all i < m and x
¡n
(m) > y
¡n
(m):
The leximin SWR, denoted %L, is deﬁned as: for all x;y 2 X ,
x %L y , there exists n 2 N such that x¡n %nL y¡n and x+n > y+n: (2)
We now formally state the characterizations by Bossert et al. (2007), which will be
used to establish our main results later.
Proposition 1 (Bossert et al. 2007, Theorem 1). A SWR % on X satisﬁes SP, FA, and
PDE if and only if %G is a subrelation to %.
10These conditions are generically referred to as two-person equity axioms in the ﬁnite population frame-
work. On this, see d’Aspremont and Gevers (2002) and Bossert and Weymark (2004).
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Proposition 2 (Bossert et al. 2007, Theorem 2). A SWR % on X satisﬁes SP, FA, and
HE if and only if %L is a subrelation to %.
Now, the natural question to ask is whether it is possible to realize the stronger
notion of impartiality formalized as QA in a strongly Paretian and equitable (in the
sense of PDE or HE) SWR. This paper provides a positive answer to this question.
We deﬁne Q-anonymous extensions of the generalized Lorenz and the leximin SWRs
in the same way as Banerjee (2006a) does for the Suppes-Sen SWR and the utilitarian
SWR.11 TheQ-generalized Lorenz criterion, denoted%QG, is deﬁned as: for all x;y 2
X ,
x %QG y , there exists P 2 Q such that Px %G y: (3)
The Q-leximin principle %QL is deﬁned as: for all x;y 2 X ,
x %QL y , there exists P 2 Q such that Px %L y: (4)
In what follows, we refer to Banerjee’s (2006a) way of extension as Q-extension.
As will be shown later, each of the Q-generalized Lorenz criterion and the Q-leximin
principle is also well-deﬁned as a SWR on X , and the former satisﬁes all of SP, QA,
and PDE and the latter satisﬁes HE as well as these three axioms. Thus, these two
Q-extensions not only provide the resolution to the distributional conﬂicts among gen-
erations but also realize the stronger notion of impartiality than FA in the intergenera-
tional welfare evaluation, i.e. can be the resolution to both two problems we mentioned
earlier.
Once the possibility of a strongly Paretian, Q-anonymous and equitable SWR is
established, we should proceed to specify the class of those SWRs in the next step.
Our main theorems provide the characterizations of the equitable subclasses of the Q-
anonymous and strongly Paretian SWRs for each of PDE and HE.
Theorem 1. A SWR % on X satisﬁes SP, QA, and PDE if and only if %QG is a
subrelation to %.
Proof. See Appendix. ¥
Theorem 2. A SWR % on X satisﬁes SP, QA, and HE if and only if %QL is a subre-
lation to %.
Proof. See Appendix. ¥
As discussed by Basu and Mitra (2007) and Banerjee (2006a), Theorems 1 and 2
are interpreted as saying that %QG (resp. %QL) is the least restrictive SWR among all
11Sect. 4 provides the formal deﬁnitions of the utilitarian SWR and the Q-anonymous extension of it. It
should be noted thatQ-anonymous SWRs are also proposed by Lauwers (1997b) and Fleurbaey and Michel
(2003).
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the SWRs that satisfy SP, QA, and PDE (resp. HE). Formally, for all x;y 2 X , we
have (
x %QG y if and only if x % y for all %2 ¥QG; (5a)
x %QL y if and only if x % y for all %2 ¥QL; (5b)
where ¥QG (resp. ¥QL) is the set of all SWRs that satisfy SP, QA, and PDE (resp.
HE). The only if part of (5a) (resp. (5b)) is obvious from the only if statement of
Theorem 1 (resp. Theorem 2). The if part of (5a) (resp. (5b)) is also straightforward
from the fact that %QG2 ¥QG (resp. %QL2 ¥QL).
4 Q-utilitarian SWR and 2-generation conﬂicts
In Theorems 1 and 2, we characterize the equitable subclasses of Q-anonymous and
strongly Paretian SWRs with the equity axioms PDE and HE. Both of PDE and HE
prescribe a resolution to the 2-generation conﬂicts where two generations i and j are
in conﬂict (xi > yi and xj < yj) and the other generations are indifferent between two
utility distributions (xk = yk for all k 6= i; j). Thus, Theorems 1 and 2 tell us how the
admissible class of SWRs will change in accordance with which of the resolution to
the 2-generation conﬂicts, PDE or HE, is required to the Q-anonymous and strongly
Paretian SWRs.
Another plausible SWR that satisﬁes both of SP and QA is the Q-extension of
the utilitarian SWR. The Q-extension of the utilitarian SWR is proposed by Banerjee
(2006a) under the name Q-utilitarian SWR. He characterizes it (precisely, all SWRs
including it as a subrelation) in terms of SP, QA, and the informational invariance
axiom called Partial Translation Scale Invariance.
Partial Translation Scale Invariance (PTSI): For all x;y 2 X , all ® 2 RN, and all
n 2 N, if x+n = y+n and x % y, then x+® % y +®.
PTSI is a different kind of axiom from those which prescribe a resolution to the 2-
generation conﬂicts such as PDE and HE. 12
The purpose of this section is to make clear the difference among the three Q-
anonymous SWRs, the Q-generalized Lorenz, the Q-leximin, and the Q-utilitarian
SWRs, in terms of their resolutions to the 2-generation conﬂicts. For this purpose, we
provide an alternative characterization of theQ-utilitarian SWR using an equity axiom
stated in the 2-generation conﬂicts.
12PTSI is also called Partial Unit Comparability. This axiom is interpreted as saying that utility differ-
ences of ﬁnitely many generations are comparable but utility levels are not. For the detailed discussion about
the invariance axioms, we refer the reader to Bossert and Weymark (2004) and d’Aspremont and Gevers
(2002).
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We begin with the formal deﬁnitions of the utilitarian SWR and its Q-extension.
Let %nU denote the ﬁnite-horizon utilitarian SWR deﬁned on Rn: for all x¡n;y¡n 2
Rn,
x¡n %nU y¡n ,
Pn
i=1 xi ¸
Pn
i=1 yi:
The utilitarian SWR%U is deﬁned by the ﬁnite-horizon utilitarian SWR and the Pareto
criterion: for all x;y 2 X ,
x %U y , there exists n 2 N such that x¡n %nU y¡n and x+n > y+n: (6)
The Q-utilitarian SWR %QU is deﬁned as follows: for all x;y 2 X ,
x %QU y , there exists P 2 Q such that Px %U y: (7)
We now introduce an axiom stated in the 2-generation conﬂicts. Both of the utilitar-
ian and the Q-utilitarian SWRs prescribe the following resolution to the 2-generation
conﬂicts.13
Incremental Equity (IE): For all x;y 2 X , if there exist i; j 2 N such that (i)
xi ¡ yi = yj ¡ xj , and (ii) xk = yk for all k 2 N n fi; jg, then x » y.
In contrast to PDE, this axiom asserts that, for any transfer between two generations,
the pre-transfer utility stream and the post-transfer stream are considered to be equally
good without any reference to the relative utility levels of conﬂicting two generations.
Thus, IE is interpreted as saying that the intergenerational decision making must be
neutral with respect to any utility transfer between two generations. Since a transposi-
tion of two generations’ utilities is a special case of utility transfer between two gen-
erations, IE implies FA.14 Furthermore, the following proposition tells that IE clearly
distinguishes the SWRs including the utilitarian SWR as a subrelation from the other
strongly Paretian SWRs.15
Proposition 3. A SWR % on X satisﬁes SP and IE if and only if %U is a subrelation
to %.
Proof. See Appendix. ¥
In view of the proposition, and from the fact that IE implies FA, it may seem
that IE is quite strong and such a strong axiom may not be suitable for describing the
characteristics of a SWR in general. However, the purpose of this section is to make
13IEwas ﬁrst proposed by Blackorby et al. (2002) in a ﬁnite population framework. See also d’Aspremont
and Gevers (2002) and Blackorby et al. (2005).
14Note that any ﬁnite permutation is equivalently represented as a ﬁnite composition of transpositions.
15In Basu and Mitra (2007),%U is also characterized in terms of SP, FA, and PTSI.
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Table 1: Characterizations of F-anonymous SWRs and Q-extensions
SWR efﬁciency impartiality equity invariance
(least restrictive) SP FA QA PDE HE IE PTSI characterized in ...
Q-gener’d Lorenz © + © © – – Theorem 1
Gener’d Lorenz © © © – – Bossert et al. (2007)
Q-leximin © + © + © – – Theorem 2
Leximin © © + © – – Bossert et al. (2007)
Q-utilitarian
D ©
©
+
+
©
©
–
–
–
–
©
+
+
©
Theorem 3
Banerjee (2006a)
Utilitarian
D ©
©
+
©
–
–
–
–
©
+
+
©
Proposition 3
Basu and Mitra (2007)
clear the 2-generation equity property of the Q-utilitarian SWR and compare it with
those of the Q-generalized Lorenz and the Q-leximin SWRs. In this respect, IE is a
useful axiom.
We now state an alternative characterization of the Q-utilitarian SWR. As shown
in the following theorem, the Q-utilitarian SWR is also characterized in terms of SP,
QA, and IE.
Theorem 3. A SWR % on X satisﬁes SP, QA, and IE if and only if %QU is a subrela-
tion to %.
Proof. See Appendix. ¥
From Theorems 1, 2, and 3, we can categorize the admissible subclasses of Q-
anonymous and strongly Paretian SWRs in terms of the three alternative resolutions
to the 2-generation conﬂicts, PDE, HE, and IE. Table 1 summarizes the three charac-
terizations and compares them with those established by Banerjee (2006a), Basu and
Mitra (2007), and Bossert et al. (2007). For each row in Table 1, the class of SWRs that
includes the SWR in the ﬁrst column as a subrelation is characterized by the axioms
indicated by ©, and furthermore, each SWR out of the class satisﬁes (resp. violates)
the axioms indicated by + (resp. –). Compared to the characterizations in Bossert et
al. (2007), our results are regarded as establishing (i) the possibility of reﬂecting the
stronger notion of impartiality than FA in the strongly Paretian and equitable SWRs,
and compared to Banerjee’s (2006a) work, (ii) the possibility of realizing the conse-
quentialist equities in the strongly Paretian and Q-anonymous SWRs.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the possibility of adding the strong impartiality axiom for-
malized as QA in the strongly Paretian and equitable SWRs, and we obtained positive
results. In particular, we show that the Q-extension of the generalized Lorenz SWR
is characterized with SP, QA, and PDE and the Q-extension of the leximin SWR in
terms of SP, QA, and HE. We also provide the characterization of the Q-utilitarian
SWR using the equity axiom IE. Our characterizations together enable us to categorize
the admissible subclasses of the Q-anonymous and strongly Paretian SWRs in terms
of the equity axioms, PDE, HE, and IE. From Arrow’s (1963) variant of Szpilrajn’s
(1930) theorem, we can conclude that there exists an ordering onX which satisﬁes SP,
the axiom of efﬁciency,QA, the axiom of impartiality, and PDE,HE, or IE, the axioms
of consequentialist equity. These results provide plausible resolutions to the existing
impossibilities of an impartial or equitable social welfare ordering (e.g. Diamond 1965;
Sakai 2003a, 2003b, 2006; Banerjee 2006b; Hara et al. 2007) and also strengthen the
resolution established by Bossert et al. (2007) with the weaker impartiality requirement
FA.16
All the three extended criteria %QG, %QL and %QU are characterized by strength-
ening FA to QA in the lists of the axioms characterizing %G, %L and %U respec-
tively. As will be shown in Appendix, this results are generalizable to any SWR deﬁned
by using a sequence of ﬁnite-horizon SWRs satisfying certain moderate properties in
the same way as in %G, %L and %U . Such an general approach to the analysis of
inﬁnite-horizon criteria is initiated by d’Aspremont (2007) and also taken by Asheim
and Banerjee (2008) and Kamaga and Kojima (2008).
We should also note that, compared to the admissible class of SWRs obtained with
FA, incompleteness of the least restrictive SWR is improved in the class characterized
with QA. Further level of comparability beyond %QL and %QU could be achieved by
additionally imposing the axiom of preference-continuity considered in Asheim and
Tungodden (2004) or that of consistency used in Basu and Mitra (2007). In fact, as
shown by Kamaga and Kojima (2008), this approach is promising. Further exploration
of this route and a similar approach with other plausible axioms will be interesting
issues.
16In Banerjee (2006b), a social welfare ordering (SWO) is required to be representable as the Bergson-
Samuelson social welfare function, and in Diamond (1965), Sakai (2003a; 2003b; 2006) and Hara et al.
(2007) a certain continuity axiom is employed.
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Appendix
We begin with two important lemmata that shed light on properties of the Q-extension
of a F-anonymous SWR. Each of the lemmata is stated for the class of SWRs that
satisfy three basic properties common to %G, %L, and %U . Note that each of %G, %L,
and %U is deﬁned in terms of the Pareto criterion and the sequence of ﬁnite-horizon
SWRs, (%nG)n2N, (%nL)n2N, and (%nU )n2N respectively. Each of the sequences satisﬁes
the following properties:17
Property 1 (P1): For all n 2 N and all x¡n;y¡n 2 Rn if x¡ni ¸ y¡ni for all
i 2 f1; : : : ; ng and x¡n 6= y¡n, then x¡n Ân y¡n;
Property 2 (P2): For all n 2 N, all x¡n;y¡n 2 Rn, and all r 2 R, if x¡n %n y¡n
then (x¡n; r) %n+1 (y¡n; r);
Property 3 (P3): For all n 2 N and all x¡n;y¡n 2 Rn, if x¡n is a permutation of
y¡n, then x¡n »n y¡n.
The lemmata are stated for the class of inﬁnite-horizon SWRs, denoted ¥, each of
which is deﬁned in terms of a sequence of ﬁnite-horizon SWRs satisfying P1, P2, and
P3 and of the Pareto crietrion. We now formally deﬁne the class ¥. Let (%n)n2N
be a sequence of ﬁnite-horizon SWRs which consists of one ﬁnite-horizon SWR %n
for each possible length of time horizon n 2 N. Let S be the set of all possible
sequences of ﬁnite-horizon SWRs (%n)n2N that satisﬁes the properties P1 to P3. For
each (%n)n2N 2 S, we can associate a binary relation % on X as follows: for any
x;y 2 X ,
x % y , there exists n 2 N such that x¡n %n y¡n and x+n > y+n:18 (8)
Let ' denote the mapping that associates to any (%n)n2N 2 S a binary relation on X
deﬁned in (8). We deﬁne ¥ as
¥ = '(S);
i.e. the set of binary relations on X each of which is associated with a sequence of
ﬁnite-horizon relations in S in a way of (8). As will be shown in Claim 1, every binary
relation in ¥ is well-deﬁned as a SWR on X . Moreover, by P3 and (8), each binary
17P1 is the ﬁnite-horizon version of SP. P2 is a kind of separability requirement similar to Extended Inde-
pendence of the Utilities of Unconcerned Individuals (or Existence Independence) introduced by Blackorby
et al. (2002; 2005) in the framework of variable population social choice, which requires our evaluation to
be independent of the addition of an unconcerned generation. P3 is a well-known anonymity axiom in a
ﬁnite-horizon framework.
18d’Aspremont (2007) refers to this type of binary relation as simpliﬁed criterion.
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relation in ¥ isF-anonymous. For each%2 ¥, itsQ-extension, denoted%Q, is deﬁned
as follows: for all x;y 2 X ,
x %Q y , there exists P 2 Q such that Px % y: (9)
We are ready to state the following lemmata. We owe a lot to Banerjee’s (2006a)
work in establishing the lemmata. Our results are regarded as the generalizations of his
results established for the Suppes-Sen and the utilitarian SWRs.
Lemma 1. For any %2 ¥, its Q-extension %Q is also a SWR on X .
Lemma 2. For any %2 ¥, its Q-extension %Q has the following property: for any
x;y 2 X , (
x ÂQ y if and only if there exists P 2 Q such that Px Â y; (10a)
x »Q y if and only if there exists P 2 Q such that Px » y: (10b)
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof proceeds through two claims.
Claim 1. Every %2 ¥ is reﬂexive and transitive, i.e. well-deﬁned as a SWR onX .
Proof of Claim 1. Reﬂexivity is straightforward. To check the transitivity of %, con-
sider any x;y; z 2 X such that x % y and y % z. We will show x % z holds.
By (8), there exist n; n0 2 N such that (i) x¡n %n y¡n and x+n > y+n and (ii)
y¡n
0 %n0 z¡n0 and y+n0 > z+n0 . Let ¹n = maxfn; n0g. We demonstrate the proof
for the case of ¹n = n0. The same argument can be applied to the case of ¹n = n.
Notice that x+¹n > z+¹n. Thus, we are enough to show that x¡¹n %¹n z¡¹n. By P2,
x¡n %n y¡n implies (x¡n; yn+1; : : : ; y¹n) %¹n y¡¹n. By P1 and the reﬂexivity of
%¹n, x¡¹n %¹n (x¡n; yn+1; : : : ; y¹n). Since %¹n is transitive, x¡¹n %¹n y¡¹n holds, which
together with y¡¹n %¹n z¡¹n and the transitivity of %¹n gives x¡¹n %¹n z¡¹n.
Claim 2. For any %2 ¥, we have the following: for any P 2 Q and any x;y 2 X ,(
x Â y if and only if Px Â Py; (11a)
x » y if and only if Px » Py: (11b)
Proof of Claim 2. We will show that x % y if and only if Px % Py, from which the
equivalence assertions in (11a) and (11b) immediately follow.
(only if part) Assume x % y. By (8), there exists n 2 N such that
x¡n %n y¡n and x+n > y+n: (12)
Take P 2 Q arbitrarily. We want to show that Px % Py. Without loss of generality,
let P be a k-period cyclic permutation matrix. Then, we can ﬁnd n^ 2 N such that
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kn^ ¸ n. Let ¹n = kn^. Note that P (¹n) is a ﬁnite-dimensional permutation matrix.
Now, consider the following proﬁlesw; z 2 X:
w = (x¡¹n; (Px)+¹n) and z = (y¡¹n; (Py)+¹n):
From the deﬁnitions of w and z and (12), it follows that8<:w¡n %n z¡n; andw+n = (xn+1; : : : ; x¹n; (Px)+¹n) > (yn+1; : : : ; y¹n; (Py)+¹n) = z+n:
Thus, by (8), w % z. Note that, by (8) and P3, % satisﬁes FA. By FA, w » Px and
z » Py. Since, by Claim 1, % is transitive, Px % Py is obtained as desired.
(if part) Assume Px % Py. Since P 0 2 Q, we obtain x = P 0(Px) %
P 0(Py) = y by the “only if” part of the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 1. Take %2 ¥ arbitrarily and let %Q be its Q-extension. Reﬂexivity
is straightforward from the fact that I 2 Q and % is reﬂexive. We show that %Q is
transitive. Assume that x %Q y and y %Q z. Then, by (9), there exist P ;Q 2 Q such
that Px % y and Qy % z. By Claim 2, Px % y if and only if Q(Px) % Qy. By
Claim 1,% is transitive, and thusQ(Px) % z holds. SinceQP 2 Q, x %Q z follows
from (9). ¥
Proof of Lemma 2. First, we prove the equivalence assertion in (10a). Note that, by
the deﬁniton of %Q, x ÂQ y is equivalent to(
there exists P 2 Q such that Px % y; and (13a)
for allQ 2 Q;:(Qy % x): (13b)
(only if part of (10a)) Assume x ÂQ y. The proof is done by contradiction. Sup-
pose that there is no P 2 Q such that Px Â y, or equivalently, such that Px % y
and :(y % Px). From (13a), there exists P 2 Q such that Px % y. Thus, for this
P , we must have Px % y and y % Px, i.e. Px » y. Then, by (11b), we have
x = P 0(Px) » P 0y, which contradicts (13b).
(if part of (10a)) Assume that there exists P 2 Q such that Px Â y. By (9),
x %Q y. We want to show :(y %Q x). We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that
y %Q x holds. Then, by (9), there exists Q 2 Q such that Qy % x. By Claim 2,
P (Qy) % Px. Let R denote the product PQ. Since % is transitive, Px Â y and
Ry % Px giveRy Â y. Then, by (8), there exists n 2 N such that
(Ry)¡n %n y¡n and (Ry)+n > y+n.
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Note that R belongs to Q. Without loss of generality, let R be a k-period cyclic
permutation matrix, i.e., for any n^ 2 N, R(kn^) is a ﬁnite-dimensional permutation
matrix. Consider ¹n 2 N such that ¹n ¸ n and ¹n = kn^ for some n^ 2 N. By P3 and the
fact that ¹n ¸ n, we have
(Ry)¡¹n »¹n y¡¹n and (Ry)+¹n > y+¹n.
If we have (Ry)+¹n = y+¹n, Ry » y follows, and this contradicts Ry Â y. But, in
the case of (Ry)+¹n > y+¹n, we can ﬁndm 2 N such that (Ry¹n+1; : : : ; Ryk(n^+m)) >
(y¹n+1; : : : ; yk(n^+m)), which contradicts the fact that R is a k-period cyclic permuta-
tion matrix. Thus, in either case, we obtain a contradiction.
Next, we prove the equivalence assertion in (10b).
(only if part of (10b)) Assume x »Q y. Then, by (9), we can ﬁnd P 2 Q such that
Px % y. If we had Px Â y, it would follow from (10a) that x ÂQ y holds, which
contradicts x »Q y. Thus, we must have Px » y.
(if part of (10b)) Assume that there exists P 2 Q such that Px » y. Then, by
(9), we have x %Q y. Moreover, by (11b), x = P 0(Px) » P 0y holds. Then, by (9)
again, we also obtain y %Q x. Thus, x »Q y follows. ¥
We now provide the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2.
Proof of Theorem 1. (only if part) Assume that a SWR % onX satisﬁes SP, QA, and
PDE. Since QA implies FA, it follows from Proposition 1 that %G is a subrelation to
%. First, we show that if x ÂQG y then x Â y. Assume x ÂQG y. By (10a), there
exists P 2 Q such that Px ÂG y. Since %G is a subrelation to %, Px Â y holds. By
QA, x » Px. By the transitivity of %, x Â y follows. Next, assume x »QG y. We
want to show x » y. By (10b), there exists P 2 Q such that Px »G y. Since %G is
a subrelation to %, Px » y. By QA, x » Px. The transitivity of % gives x » y.
(if part) Assume that %QG is a subrelation to %. From Lemma 2 and the fact that
I 2 Q, %G is a subrelation to %QG, which means that %G is a subrelation to %. Thus,
from Proposition 1,% satisﬁes SP and PDE. As forQA, it is checked as follows. Since
%G is reﬂexive, x = P 0(Px) »G x holds for any x 2 X and any P 2 Q. By (10b),
Px »QG x. Since %QG is a subrelation to %, Px » x. ¥
Proof of Theorem 2. Using Proposition 2, the only if part is proved in the same way
as in the proof of Theorem 1. The if part is also proved by the same argument as in the
proof of Theorem 1. ¥
Next, we prove Proposition 3 and Theorem 3.
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Proof of Proposition 3. The if part is straightforward and we omit it. We prove the
only if part in two steps.
Step 1.19 We show that x » y holds whenever there exists n 2 N such thatPn
i=1 xi =
Pn
i=1 yi and x
+n = y+n. The case of n = 1 is trivial. If n ¸ 2, consider
the following operation: ﬁx ¹n 2 f1; : : : ; n ¡ 1g arbitrarily and construct ¹x 2 X as
follows: ¹x¹n = y¹n for ¹n; ¹xn = xn+x¹n¡ y¹n for n; ¹xk = xk for all k 2 N n f¹n; ng. By
IE, x » ¹x. Applying the above operation once for each ¹n 2 f1; : : : ; n¡1g repeatedly,
we can construct the proﬁle y from x. Then, the transitivity of % gives x » y.
Step 2. From Step 1 and (6), it is obvious that if x »U y then x » y. We show
that if x ÂU y then x Â y. Assume x ÂU y. By (6), there exists n 2 N such that
(
Pn
i=1 xi;x
+n) > (
Pn
i=1 yi;y
+n). Then, we can ﬁnd ¹n ¸ n such that
P¹n
i=1 xi >
P¹n
i=1 yi and x
+¹n > y+¹n.
Take z 2 X such that z1 = y1 +
P¹n
i=1(xi ¡ yi), zi = yi for all i 2 f2; : : : ; ¹ng, and
zj = xj for all j 2 f¹n + 1; ¹n + 2; : : : g. From Step 1, x » z follows. By SP, z Â y.
The transitivity of % gives x Â y. ¥
Proof of Theorem 3. Using Proposition 3, the proof is done in the same way as in the
proof of Theorem 1. ¥
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